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ABSTRACT

How does the school instruct us? What is it like for a student to learn in a school?
The following thesis construes the school as a site for disciplinary technology purportedly
oriented toward educating students. My conceptual analysis rests on the intersection
between the sociohistorical practice of schooling and the lived experience of students. I
contrast schooling (the organization of a primary planned environment for instruction)
and education (an existential facet of growth and social connectedness) at the center of
the essay. My argument has three parts. First, I examine Michel Foucault’s concept of
disciplinary technology as it pertains to the school. Second, I develop the existential
presuppositions of Foucault’s argument through evidence from the field of
phenomenology. Third, I sketch a normative conception of education, supported by the
philosophy of John Dewey and elaborate on the dangers of discipline through a reading
of Martin Heidegger’s “The Question Concerning Technology.” While this thesis
thoroughly problematizes a central aspect of modern pedagogy, it does not provide
simple solutions and merely hopes to examine the complicated intersection between
“disciplinary” pedagogy and lived experience in order to deepen our understanding of
each of these fields.
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INTRODUCTION

QUESTIONING THE SCHOOL

My thesis research began with the apparently simple and direct question: “how
have I been educated?”. Such a question carries weight by being familiar, personal,
relatable, and yet it is not a question that is easily approached. It is plainly philosophical
in that the question does not in itself beget the application of a particular method;
moreover, answering it requires introducing many further questions as well as many
varied attempts at addressing such questions. At the outset, I find myself opening onto a
field that is both “supersaturated” and also one with numerous points of entry,
innumerable objects for possible study, several methods of approach, and many academic
fields that could be utilized. In this introduction, I discuss the field of concern that
motivates this essay and also layout the scaffolding for the particular path I have chosen
to take to explore that concern further.
I am senior at the University of Maine, studying philosophy and political science.
This spring will proffer another academic ritual for me--college graduation. My B.A. will
be the conclusion of a decade and a half of studies in the United States. I am at a moment
where I need to decide what comes next, and like many before me I want to reflect on
and consult what I have already decided--that is, where I have been. Here my question
shifts with the words “so many before me.” Sure, I experience my singularity and ipseity,
but I can also recognize my substitutability. Standing in line at graduation, sitting in a
desk during classes, paying loans: from a certain institutional standpoint, I am
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exchangeable. I am anyone. For this reason, the question of how one is educated has
taken on a specific significance for me at this stage of my life.
This brings me closer to the field of concern that situates a still more specific
thesis question. “How is one educated?” is a question that I find as interesting as it is
inaccessible given my current skill set. It falls into similar pitfalls as the personal
question I asked, “How have I been educated?”. It is by working with these questions that
I arrive at my project.
In addition to its personal roots, this thesis grows from my intersecting studies of
phenomenology and politics. My engagement with the former has developed my concern
for the personal and relational, while the latter directs my attention toward a deep concern
for institutionalized power structures. From my interest in phenomenological philosophy,
when I think about education, I consider the precarious, ongoing, and unavoidable project
of personal development that each of us undertakes in relationship to the world and to
others. From my studies in political science, when I question education, the political
institutions that aim at educating, namely schools, also come immediately to mind and
into question. The school is a collectively supported institution, and yet each student
needs to develop personal strategies in order to navigate through it. From this
intersection, I selected a philosophical project. I ask the still open-ended question: “How
does the school instruct students?”.
In order to address this question thoroughly, I evaluate the school as a place of
application for disciplinary technology, a form of power relations examined in Foucault’s
Discipline and Punish. This allows me to examine Foucault’s thesis that society can
invest individuals with forms of behavior and value systems. Furthermore, I am interested
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in moving “behind” Discipline and Punish in order to explore a complementary level of
analysis: the lived experience of students. In this direction, I apply several concepts from
the field of Phenomenology to discuss how the institutional practice of “schooling”
intersects with the personal project of “dwelling” or becoming at-home in the world.
Through these two directions of analysis (sociohistorical and experiential), and by
arguing for a normative sense of education that contrasts with “schooling,” I further
problematize disciplinary schooling and begin to offer alternative directions.
We all act, and are acted upon in manifold ways throughout our lives. We develop
our personal identities within each of these dimensions of experience. Maurice MerleauPonty and other phenomenologists are useful in understanding identity construction,
because of their commitment to describing the experience of involvement in the world as
it appears in a first-person manner. Furthermore, I observe that we, sociohistorical
collectives of persons, organize spatial arrangements, temporal durations, cultural
objects, and behavioral styles for us, experiencing agents, to inherit. We “inherit” such
collective projects by sustaining, altering, or abandoning them. Critical social theorists,
like Foucault, focus on the way that such collective practices delimit the possibilities for
individual development. While these personal and collective practices intersect, the
temporality of these collective practices does not coincide entirely with the time of our
personal development; our personal process of self-development is interrupted by (and
interrupts) this social activity.1 While one necessarily depends upon guidance from
others, and common institutions of meaning (like language, normality, animality, etc.) in
order to maintain effective relationships to spaces, times, objects, and others, one cannot
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Judith Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself, (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), 35-36.
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ultimately depend on others to construct these relationships for oneself. This existential
work is always, inexplicably “mine” for each and every one of us. Each of us needs to
develop such relationships, whether we recognize that we are doing so or not.
When one considers the guidance that we give and receive from others, one is
faced with the reality that the cultural world is segmented. Deleuze and Guattari
creatively explore such segmentarity at length in A Thousand Plateaus.
We are segmented from all around and in every direction. The human
being is a segmentary animal. Segmentarity is inherent to all the strata
composing us. Dwelling, getting around, working, playing: life is spatially
and socially segmented. The house is segmented according to its rooms'
assigned purposes; streets, according to the order of the city; the factory,
according to the nature of the work and operations performed in it. We are
segmented in a binary fashion, following the great major dualist
oppositions: social classes, but also men-women, adults-children, and so
on. We are segmented in a circular fashion, in ever larger circles, ever
wider disks or coronas, like Joyce's ‘letter’: my affairs, my neighborhood's
affairs, my city's, my country's, the world's ... We are segmented in a
linear fashion, along a straight line or a number of straight lines, of which
each segment represents an episode or "proceeding": as soon as we finish
one proceeding we begin another, forever proceduring or procedured, in
the family, in school, in the army, on the job. School tells us, ‘You're not
at home anymore’; the army tells us, ‘You're not in school anymore’ …2
One can begin to experience the weight of such segmentarity in the very style of this
staccato paragraph. The school, a complicated and prevalent institution of modern
society, is the “segment” of life that I am bringing under philosophical investigation.
Perhaps it is obvious that the school itself operates by enforcing segmentarity, but such
common sense should not prevent us from exploring this phenomenon. Instead, the
provocative claim that “the human being is a segmentary animal” should help guide us
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Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian
Massumi, (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 208-209.
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into the rich question this thesis hopes to explore: how does the school “school” us? What
segments does it create and how do we inherit them?
At the outset, the central terms “education” and “the school” should be
preliminarily defined. Both of these terms circulate commonly and can seem to be
immediately comprehensible, but for a systematic analysis their meanings should be as
clear as possible. Following a Deweyan distinction between these terms, education lends
itself to two broad and interrelated definitions, while the school should be initially
understood as a means of education. The two definitions for education that I suggest
follow the distinction that we have begun to explore between social and individual
temporality.
At the social level, education is a necessity for the continuity of the life of any
group or collective practice.3 It is common to discuss the life of a nation, a tribe, a club,
or any group, but (as noted above) the time that these groups occupy is not synonymous
with the life of any particular individual. A group can disband without any members
dying, and it can persist when many of the constitutive individuals perish. As any living
thing, John Dewey argues, societies survive by constant renewals. All constituent
members of a social group begin their lives without comprehensive language, beliefs,
values, norms, and the re-creation of such social practices allows the life of the group to
persist. The renewing activity that allows society to exist is education. Education is this
communication of habits of thinking, doing, and feeling. As Dewey elaborates, to give or
receive communication is to have “an enlarged and changed experience.”4 When

3

John Dewey, Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education, (New York:
Free Press 1944), 2.
4
Dewey, Democracy and Education, 5.
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listening, one shares in the thoughts and feelings of another, and insofar has her own
experience modified. When conveying an experience, one must formulate the experience
while considering how it would appear to another, and necessarily has her own attitude
toward the experience modified. The social necessity of education leads organically to
the individual definition.
To the individual, education is the broadening and deepening of experience: it is
synonymous with growth. Said in another form, insofar as an activity broadens and
deepens experience, it is educative. The human infant is highly dependent on others in
order to persist, and begins with plasticity--the ability to grow.5 Humans begin with a
vibrant social environment and the ability to learn from experiences. Partaking in the
reconstruction of the values, beliefs, aims, and norms of the group is educative for the
constituent members--especially in those social groups that establish the growth of
constituents as a primary value. Educative lessons can also occur outside of interpersonal
communication, as when an individual struggles with a personal challenge alone, but as
fundamentally interdependent beings no activity takes place entirely outside of the social
background.6 The growth of individual members, in turn, provides a basis for the growth
of social groups, as the new members creatively modify the traditions they inherit. Each
level of our definition of education leads to the other. Education is the broadening and
deepening of a person’s experience, and (insofar as it is connected to social beings)
accounts for the continuity and growth of social groups.

5

Dewey, Democracy and Education, 42
Ibid., 44. Dewey memorably chastises the illusion of complete self-sufficiency as “an unnamed form of
insanity which is responsible for a great deal of the remediable suffering in the world.”
6
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Schooling is the organization of a planned environment for education. While
many places and experiences are educative, the school is an institution formally intended
to direct the youth toward sharing and shaping the common life of the group. Living
always affords educative opportunities, but many of these are lessons are incidental. In
contrast, the raison d’etre of school is in its effect on the quality of conscious life. It
provides a place for directing the growth of the students. Directing the students’ growth is
an accurate explanation of teaching, because
the only way in which adults consciously control the kind of education
which the immature get is by controlling the environment in which they
act, and hence think and feel. We never educate directly, but indirectly by
means of the environment.7
Schools are an established medium for the tuition of the young. This environment could
be thought of as a unity of many orders (symbols, social roles, norms, concepts,
exercises, periods, spaces, etc.) with which the activity of the students must vary. The
activity of the students is a constitutive element of the school environment. A school is an
environment designed with the deliberate intention of educating.
While these preliminary definitions are important, I doubt that a satisfactory
response to the question “how does the school instruct us?” will become clear from
deduction alone. Discussing the school, for example, will require us to step beyond the
concept of a school as a planned instructional space, to the concrete relations internally
organized in schools. In this direction, I take up a reading of a recent critical philosopher,
Michel Foucault, in order to focus on the ways that we are acted upon within the school,
and I explore presuppositions in Foucault’s argument to understand the activity of
students within the school. While in their intention, schools may be a means for
7

Dewey, Democracy and Education, 18-19.
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educating, in practice schooling and education may have a more complicated
relationship.
Foucault would agree with Dewey that the school is modern society’s primary
planned environment for instruction, but by analyzing the predominant power structures
in the school, Foucault argues that it is also an institution that has been indelibly tied to
an exhaustive form of social control--“discipline.” Foucault seems to extend the
observation that one can only direct the education of another person by controlling the
environment, by arguing that a very particular environment can invest a person with
predetermined values, ideas, and behaviors. By reading Foucault, I hope to understand
“the political investments of the body that [the institution] gathers together in its closed
architecture.”8 I want to understand how the school may in fact invest our bodies with
behaviors, attitudes, and concepts. Foucault argues that modern schooling normalizes
students into the attitudes, habits, and concepts that allow for a directable, efficient, but
politically ineffectual social body.
In the first chapter of this thesis, I establish the concept of discipline. I then
briefly explore Foucault’s engagement with power relations and the modern form of
power relations that he distills in Discipline and Punish--namely, the Panopticon. I then
step back to discuss the particular ways that Foucault suggests that panoptic principles
develop and operate in the school. This process focuses my analysis on the structuring of
spaces, times, and object relations in school to see how such segmentation leads to what
Foucault calls “docile bodies.”9 I consider how such “docile” students are subjected to
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Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York:
Random House, 1977), 31.
9
Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 135-169.
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“correct training” by means of normative judgments and hierarchical observation in order
to enact the total form of disciplinary power.10 Throughout this section, I will supplement
Foucault’s particular examples by my own schooling experiences, in effect arguing that
discipline continues to be an effective organizing principle for understanding schooling.
In the second chapter of the thesis, I explore the irreducible forms of embodied
behavior presupposed in the concept of discipline. In order for discipline to function, the
subjected persons need to skillfully deploy instruments, develop practices into habits, and
experience anxiety under the weight of surveilling gazes. I explore these forms of
behavior through several key phenomenological concepts--namely Heidegger’s
encountering through “readiness-to-hand,” Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of habit-body,
and Sartre’s conceptualization of “the look.” These phenomenological concepts enrich
the foundations of discipline, and provide important points of contrast to disciplinary
power.
Finally, in the third chapter of the thesis, I explain the tremendous danger of the
school’s disciplinary aspects, and I contrast this sense of schooling with a normative
concept of education. I expand upon the problems of panoptic schooling by elaborating
on the dangers of this “technology,” through a reading of Martin Heidegger’s essay “The
Question Concerning Technology.” Then I contrast schooling with an existentiallyinformed sense of education, connected to the philosophy of Dewey and the project of
becoming at home in the world.11 Disciplinary technology risks making students mere
resources of society, rather than recognizing their essential role in shaping their society,

10
11

Ibid., 171-194
Dewey, Democracy and Education, 10-22
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therefore I argue that a moral sense of education is antithetical to the political “docility”
described by Foucault.
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CHAPTER 1

THE SCHOOL AND DISCIPLINE

“We are segmented from all around and in every direction. The human being is a segmentary
animal [...] forever proceduring or procedured, in the family, in school, in the army, on the job.”12

In this chapter, I describe the ways that we are “procedured” and “proceduring” in
the school. I begin by exploring how we are procedured in the school. I want to get a
sense of how thoroughly we are shaped by this institution, and to do so in a systematic
way. In order to structure this aspect of schooling adequately, I follow Foucault’s
discussion of power relations in the school within Discipline and Punish to see how
student behavior is directed by the school environment. The segmentarity that Gilles
Deleuze and Félix Guattari describe may seem to be such a ubiquitous aspect of the
creation of a place for the school in society at large, and of organizing the internal
operations of the school that I do not want to merely raise a truism. Foucault argues that
much of the segmentarity in the school is not arbitrary, but part of a comprehensive
process of investing power in bodies called “discipline.” I begin this chapter by
presenting this central term, and then briefly explore Foucault’s engagement with
“power,” since discipline is constantly referred to as a form of power. I then discuss the
model of disciplinary power (the “Panopticon”), and the emergence and adjustments to
this model in actual scholastic settings. Effectively, this chapter hopes to explore the

12

Deleuze, Gilles, and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian
Massumi, (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 208-209.
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continued relevance for the concept of discipline in understanding schooling. Let us
begin to see how this is so.
Foucault uses “discipline” as a technical term: it is an emergent technology for
organizing social relations that has a history. Rather than providing a fixed definition for
discipline from the beginning of his argument, Foucault names the third part of his book
“Discipline” and lets the meaning of the term unfold across the argument.13 This could be
because the meaning that discipline has as a familiar vocabulary word can help to
illustrate the technical term: it is a means of adjusting behavior and habits. Selecting this
familiar word suggests that Foucault does not want discipline to be thought of as an
inaccessible abstraction. It is practical and accessible, but its history needs to be closely
studied. Many historical quotes that Foucault selects even use the word themselves.14
From this historical analysis, Foucault analyzes “discipline” as a referent applied to a
series of practices that individuate, supervise, and coerce behavior from bodies.
Discipline is the unifying principle for the historical ascendance of a new power of
punishment by coercion that accompanied the formation of republican states. The
following indicates more fully the meaning of discipline as a technical term:
Discipline may be identified neither with an institution nor with an
apparatus; it is a type of power, a modality for its exercise comprising a
whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application,
targets; it is a ‘physics’ or an ‘anatomy’ of power, a technology.15

13

Michel Foucault, “Part III: Discipline,” in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, translated
Alan Sheridan (New York: Random House, 1977). My analysis of Foucault largely draws from this part of
Discipline and Punish, which is composed of three chapters: “Docile Bodies,” “The Means of Correct
Training,” and “Panopticism.”
14
Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 16. “‘Discipline must be made national,’ said Guibert. ‘The state that I
depict will have a simple, reliable, easily controlled administration. It will resemble those huge machines,
which by quite uncomplicated means produce great effects.’”
15
Ibid., 215.
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Discipline is the technology of power relations that came to predominance across the
17th and 18th centuries. In fairness to Foucault, I do not want to strip the word of its
accessibility any further; instead, the meaning will become clearer over the course of this
chapter. For now, discipline should be thought of as techniques for correcting the
behavior of bodies.
Foucault observes that the demands on the behavior of the body in modern society
are extremely pressing: one must continually act in the proper manner, toward the right
objects, in the correct spaces, over the expected duration, alongside others, with an
awareness of oneself. There is a tradition of thought that has long considered virtue to
make such demands on human behavior, but Foucault examines the concrete mechanisms
by which society directs human behavior more exactingly toward such norms.16 Human
bodies have “always been in the grip of very strict powers,” but with disciplinary power
“there is a [new] modality: it implies an uninterrupted, constant coercion, supervising the
process of the activity rather than its result [...] and it partitions as closely as possible
time, space, movement.”17 Through his analysis of discipline, Foucault argues that much
of our individual behavior is actually the result of an investment in us by exhaustive
relations of control. Tracing the development of the power relations that can make such
sustained demands on the body, Foucault uncovers a specific form for disciplinary

16

Aristotle, W.D. Ross, and Lesley Brown, The Nicomachean Ethics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2009). In Book II, Chapter 6, Aristotle argues that “[Moral virtue] is concerned with passions and actions,
and in these there is excess, defect, and the intermediate. For instance, both fear and confidence and
appetite and anger and pity and in general pleasure and pain may be felt both too much and too little, and in
both cases not well; but to feel them at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right
people, with the right motive, and in the right way, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is
characteristic of virtue. Similarly with regard to actions also there is excess, defect, and the intermediate.”
The intermediate and best expression of passions and actions are done in variation with self, others, objects,
means and times.
17
Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 136-137.
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power: the Panopticon.18 Before we address this form, we should briefly explore
Foucault’s conceptualization of power.
Foucault and Power
Each and every one of us has been born into a world that was not of our making.
There were already people, objects, narratives, norms and languages that conditioned the
world we grow up within. Most importantly for our current inquiry, when we were born,
there were already some systems of government in place, and there was a discoverable
history that could help explain the particulars of the time and place into which each of us
is thrown.19 Looking to the past in order to understand the current systems of punishment,
for example, Foucault notices that calls for prison reform are nearly as old as this form of
punishment, and that the issue does not seem to be with particular harms done by the
prison environment, rather the issue is “its very materiality as an instrument and vector of
power; it is this whole technology of power over the body.”20 Foucault maintains that the
exhaustively designed environments of many modern institutions (prisons, workshops,
army camps, schools, etc.) can “invest” our bodies with certain behaviors, inclinations,
concepts and beliefs. These institutions create and support the norms that condition (and
therefore both allow for and limit) our experiences and understandings. Foucault further
argues that our behavior is, to a large degree, a meticulous investment from the society

18

Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 200-205.
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John MacQuarrie and Edward Robinson, (New York: Harper
and Row, 1962), 174, 219-224, 264. “Throwness” is a term Heidegger used to describe the way we find
ourselves caught up in the midst of a definite world and some entities within the world. When he introduces
the term in Being and Time he says that the term “is meant to suggest the facticity of [Dasein’s] being
delivered over. The ‘that it is and has to be.’”
20
Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 30.
19
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into which we are born. He comes to these conclusions largely as the result of his critical
engagement with social theory, particularly around the concept of power.
Throughout his oeuvre, Foucault consistently inverted the traditional question of
political philosophy. Rather than asking how philosophy, as “that discourse which par
excellence is concerned with truth,”21 can discover the essence and limits of sovereignty
(and thereby determine legitimacy), Foucault asks how power operates at the periphery,
where the state becomes capillary and most directly interacts with the people.22 Rather
than wondering what a “true” exercise of power looks like, Foucault asks what “truths”
are created by the exercise of power in a society. We could restate that question by asking
“what mechanisms are used to control the public?”. A central consequence of Foucault’s
analysis is that the conduct of the individual is largely the result of “all the political
investments of the body” that follow our particular system of power relations.23
Power, in Foucault’s analysis, is most simply expressed as action upon the field of
actions.24 Foucault observes that we all act within particular conditions, and some actions
change these conditions. Insofar as an action sustains, restricts, or expands the field in
which we act, that action is an expression of power. Power, as a consequence, is not a
property that something or someone possesses, power circulates throughout the field. It is
always relational, and exists between actions. Insofar as one’s actions can be affected by
others, and vice versa, a situation of power is present. This is effectively to say that
whenever there are multiple people together, there is some situation of power.

21

Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, edited Colin
Gordon, (New York: Vintage Books, 1980), 93. Original emphasis.
22
Ibid., 94.
23
Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 31.
24
Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” Critical Inquiry, Vol. 8, No. 4 (summer, 1982), 789.
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Foucault likens power to the broader meaning that “government” had in the
sixteenth century. Today, the term “government” is concerned with political institutions
and issues of the state, but in the sixteenth century “it designated the way in which the
conduct of individuals or of groups might be directed.”25 By acting upon our environment
(the conditions in which our actions are situated), we “govern” our behavior and the
actions of others. All social formations change the conditions in which actions occur, and
as a result we cannot talk about a society without power, nor will the destruction of all
power relationships. A society “beyond” or “without” power can only be imagined by
abstracting from the real.
The necessity of power relations for associated life requires that they be analyzed.
Whenever there is a social relation, there is also some power relation; but how power
exists concretely in any particular social situation remains a question for analysis.26 Thus,
the omnipresence of power in associated life “makes all the more politically necessary
the analysis of power relations in a given society.”27 That power is an ever-present
feature of associated life needs to be qualified by the recognition that forms of power
vary wildly, depending on the demands of the society and the mechanisms it employs.

25

Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 790.
Jacques Derrida, “The Politics of Friendship,” The Journal of Philosophy 85, no. 11 (1988), 634. Derrida
makes this point in “The Politics of Friendship,” carrying what we are calling power relations (actions on
the field of actions, or governing) to the dyadic form of an originary expression with a particular other. In
the very act of addressing another, in the moment we begin to signify something to someone, we find we
are already caught up in responsibility. In relating to others, “we are already taken or caught up, each and
any one of us, in a kind of asymmetrical and heternomcial curvature of the social space, more precisely, in
the relation to the other prior to any organized socius, to any determined ‘government’ to any ‘law.’ [...]
Please note: prior to any determined law, as either natural law or positive law, but not prior to any law in
general, because this heteronomical and asymmetrical curvature of a sort of originary sociality is a law,
perhaps the very essence of law” (Derrida, 634). This address will also require some conditions for
communicability. There must be norms of recognition, language, signs belonging to “anyone.” These
conditions are Foucault’s focus, rather than dyadic connections to particular others. In either case, sociality
is “governing.”
27
Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 791.
26
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Furthermore, from the observation that power relations in general are necessary, it does
not follow that the particular, established power relations in a society are necessary. We
should distill a few of consequences from the conceptualization of power as a relational
property that delimits the field of actions before proceeding to analyze how power
operates in the school.
Power relations are always ongoing processes. Power is expressed in a
determinable set of actions that affect other ones. There is no inert power nor any
“substance” called power. Power is always in action. Indeed, Foucault says that power
relations could be considered an ongoing result of relations of confrontation:
A relationship of confrontation reaches its term, its final moment (and the
victory of one of the two adversaries) when stable mechanisms replace the
free play of antagonistic reactions. Through such mechanisms one can
direct in a fairly consistent manner and with reasonable certainty, the
conduct of others.28
Any relationship of open confrontation wishes to resolve into a power relationship, and
power relationships can fail in one of two ways: when the persons directed by a power
dynamic are reduced to complete impotence, or when a relationship of confrontation
(re)emerges wherein the “governed” becomes an “adversary” aiming to set up a new way
to govern--a new power relation.29
This brings us to the second consequence of Foucault’s definition of power:
situations of power only exist between agents. As we just observed, when one ceases to
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act, we cannot identify a power relationship. There is an inalienable, and perhaps
counterintuitive dependency of power on freedom. In contemplating power, one may be
prone to thinking that when a person lives within a power dynamic, that person loses her
freedom. Foucault would argue that power has an interest in preserving the ability to act,
even encouraging actions from the governed, but only soliciting those actions designated
appropriate. If one thinks of freedom as the ability to enact possibilities, to do some
things and not do others, one needs to recognize that power simultaneously helps to enact
possibilities and limits them. Power is often expressed in the designation of appropriate
actions, the punishments for other actions, and the way actions are surveyed.
Foucault thinks that we live out of a relationship toward our power situation.
Power not only limits the possibilities available to each of us, it also supports the
conditions that are essential for self-actualization. For example, Foucault writes,
“[m]astery and awareness of one’s own body can be acquired only through the effect of
an investment of power in the body.”30 One would not be able to achieve bodily
awareness without public practices--exercises, muscle-building, aesthetic appreciation,
sexual norms, discussions with others. All such public practices enter a domain
established by power relations. Yet, as Foucault argues, “...once power produces this
effect, there inevitably emerge responding claims [...] Power, after investing itself in the
body, finds itself exposed to counterattack.”31 While this public domain is supported by
in a situation of power, and we depend upon it to self-actualize, we also must take a
stance regarding the power situation in which we find ourselves thrown (to borrow
Heidegger’s parlance again).
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In summary, each of us is born into a history and into particular forms of
“government.” The temporality of such governing forms does not coincide with the time
of our lives; language, norms, and social groups predate our birth and will, in all
likelihood, exceed our death. These distinct temporalities sustain each other: such
governing forms can only be what they are as we take them up, yet we depend upon them
to provide the conditions for meaningful engagement. We are “governed” by the
organization of a field of “appropriate” actions that solicits “normal” behavior, and
creates a realm of deviancy. We are not merely objects studied by power relations, we
also are the vehicles of it, and are capable of amending it. If we follow Foucault in
scrutinizing these facts, we will begin to see that the social environment organized in
various institutions is not politically neutral territory, but rather a situation of power
organized in support of a style of sociality. We will also see that the actual forms of
implementation for a power relation could vary dramatically.
Now that we have a richer sense of power, I would like to return to discipline, the
form of power that Foucault argues operates in the school and modern society at large.
Foucault’s discussion of discipline continues to provide insight into the way that we are
governed in the school. Discipline is not something that was invented by any single
theorist or institution, but rather the unification and resonance of various techniques of
control deployed across the breadth of distinctly modern social institutions: schools,
hospitals, workplaces, prisons, military camps, etc.
The ‘invention’ of this new political anatomy must not be seen as a sudden
discovery. It is rather a multiplicity of often minor processes, of different
origin and scattered location, which overlap, repeat, or imitate one
another, [...] distinguish themselves from one another according to their
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domain of application, converge and gradually produce the blueprint of a
general method.32
Though Foucault is clearly reluctant to credit anyone with the invention of discipline, he
argues that Bentham articulates the blueprint for disciplinary technology. Bentham
provides the articulation in the design of the Panopticon.

The Panopticon
Before turning specifically to the Panopticon and panoptic effects, it is important
to establish the historical and political setting in which these first emerged. Discipline
and Punish provides a chilling, detailed examination of how modern power relations
emerged within the broad social and historical movement in Europe toward democratic
societies. Foucault argues that, in the historical movement away from monarchical
society toward republican governments (and the conjoining discourses establishing new
conceptions of legitimacy and political liberty), there was an under-recognized
countermovement manifested in novel forms of bodily control. For example Foucault
argues that “the Roman model, at the Enlightenment, played a dual role: in its republican
aspect, it was the very embodiment of liberty; in its military aspect, it was the ideal
schema of discipline.”33 Foucault traces a change in the methods of punishment that
occurs over this period, and recognizes that techniques of coercion become the dominant
model rather than the previous practice of spectacles of vengeance against transgressors.
Coercion focused on methods for training the body “by the traces it leaves, in the form of
habits, in behavior.”34 These techniques of coercion are defended in moral arguments and
32
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codified in the legal systems, but Foucault is interested in understanding how they are put
into practice. These developing techniques aim to constitute “the obedient subject, the
individual subjected to habits, rules, order, an authority that is exercised continually
around him and upon him, and which he must allow to automatically in him.”35 In order
to craft these obedient subjects, new, diffuse, and broad-reaching methods for controlling
the behavior of members of society were established in the peculiarly modern
institutions.
As a form of power, discipline is particularly effective because it begins to
simultaneously expand the agency of the governed in terms of skills and possibilities, and
to increase their domination by increasing the definition and adaptability of the limits of
the field of appropriate action. Foucault recognizes that this double movement is the
compelling force of disciplinary power, “[discipline] is ultimately dependent on the
principle, which induces a genuinely new economy of power, that one must be able
simultaneously both to increase the subjected forces and to improve the force and
efficiency of that which subjects them.”36 Whereas previous power relations merely
increased the subjection of the governed, or reduced that constraint to allow the capacities
of the governed to organically improve, discipline begins with the principle that the
capacities of the governed can improve whilst the efficiency of that which directs them
improves. Discipline has a distinct character as a form of power by systematically
developing the field of actions for the subjected, and the ability to act on this field.
The model Foucault presents to conceptualize disciplinary power is an
architectural construction for centralized inspection called “the Panopticon”--a design
35
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originally crafted by Jeremy Bentham.37 Bentham imagined that the Panopticon would be
particularly fitting for “penitentiary-houses,” yet it was described as “a new principle of
construction applicable to any sort of establishment in which persons of any description
are to be put under inspection,” including prisons, manufactories, asylums, poorhouses,
hospitals and schools.38 The basic schematic is succinctly described by Foucault:
Bentham’s Panopticon is the architectural figure of this composition. We
know the principle on which it is based: at the periphery, an angular
building; at the center, a tower; this tower is pierced with wide windows
that open onto the inner side of the ring; the peripheric building is divided
into cells, each of which extends the whole width of the building; they
have two windows, one on the inside, corresponding to the windows of the
tower; the other, on the outside, allows the light to cross the cell from one
end to the other. All that is needed, then, is to place a supervisor in a
central tower and to shut up in each cell a madman, a patient, a
condemned man, a worker or a schoolboy.39
There are several aspects of this design that are worth examining in greater detail. Most
significant for our purposes is the fact that within the Panopticon, each person’s time,
space, and interpersonal relations are highly controlled beginning with the very
architectural design. Indeed, Foucault is suggesting that this design alone accounts for a
large degree of the governing of the target audience.40
In the Panopticon, time is broken into a series of planned durations--from
determining the total duration that one is meant to spend within the structure to
determining the minute activities of a single day. Regular shifts for the supervisors and a

37

Bentham, Jeremy. The Works of Jeremy Bentham Vol. 4, published by his executor John Bowring
(Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838-1843). Pages 60-66 discuss the Panopticon’s applicability to the school.
38
Ibid., 36.
39
Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 200.
40
Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 202. Foucault argues that essentially any person whatsoever could be
placed into the supervisor/supervised positions and the disciplinary effect could still take place. “[The
Panopticon] automates and disindividualizes power. Power has its principle not so much in a person as in a
certain concerted distribution of bodies, surfaces, lights, gazes; in an arrangement whose internal
mechanisms produce the relation in which individuals are caught up. [...] Consequently, it does not matter
who exercises power. Any individual, taken almost at random, can operate the machine” (Foucault, 202).

22

predetermined period of enclosure for the observed determine the length of each person’s
total stay within the structure. The duration of the custody of the observed would be
determined in the social codes: inmates in prisons would have time proportional to the
offense; patients in hospitals require time corresponding to the illness, and students are
forced to remain in schools until a socially determined maturity. The supervisor's time
spent in the institution is prepared in advance by employment contracts (another type of
social code). Any variations throughout the day, week, or months follow prepared
timetables. These timetables follow regular patterns, and create repetitive cycles of time.
Furthermore, the Panopticon can be used for particular hours of the day or be
implemented totally: “applied to [schools], you will find it capable of two very
distinguishable degrees of extension:—It may be confined to the hours of study; or it may
be made to fill the whole circle of time, including the hours of repose, and refreshment,
and recreation.”41 Bentham seems to indicate that all of a person’s life activities could
take place within a Panopticon. All these durations are fixed in advance, preventing
anyone in the system from arbitrarily determining when they will act, and conditioning
their very perception of time passing.
The Panopticon methodically prepares spatial arrangements within the central
tower, within the cell, between these forms, and in relation to an exterior. Bentham
imagines the tower has disguised entrances and exits, internal partitions between
supervisors, and large windows (obscured from without by venetian blinds) facing all of
the rooms. The cells are backlit by windows facing the outside, and have a massive
window on the side of the cell facing the tower, which must remain unobstructed. The
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cells are large enough for the necessary amenities (bed, toilet, etc.), but nothing beyond
the essentials. Small cells allow the maximum number of rooms surrounding the central
tower, which is set a secure distance from the cells and arranged so all of the cells are
visible. The entire institution is for the most part closed in on itself, erecting walls around
the ring of cells, and specifying the lines of approach and departure.
The interpersonal relations organized within the Panopticon are twofold: those
inside the Panopticon are separated from each other, and the supervisors can always see
the supervised, but the supervised can never see the supervisors. There are no windows
between the cells occupied by each prisoner, nor are there windows in the internal
partitions in the tower. Such “lateral invisibility [...] is a guarantee of order.”42
Specifically, lateral invisibility prevents disease from spreading between patients,
prevents a plot from developing between inmates, or “if they are schoolchildren, there is
no copying, no noise, no chatter, no waste of time.”43 From the perspective of a person in
the cell, the only constant social relation is being on display for a central tower. Any
other periodic social connections (instruction, punishment, chit-chat) are organized from
the center and supervised. From the perspective of the tower, instead of a compact mass
of bodies, there are a series of neatly ordered “cases” to witness and act upon.
The interpersonal relations between supervisor and subject are organized to
undermine the typical dyad between seen/seers and seers/seen. Typically, when one
witness another, the observer can themselves be seen; the observed at least has the
possibility to reverse the gaze. Additionally, under normal circumstances either person
could leaving the situation, and exit from the other’s visibility. Within the Panopticon this
42
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is impossible; the seers can never be seen and the seen can never hide. This effect is
achieved by the design of the Panopticon. The cells are illuminated by light, and the
window facing the tower must never be obstructed. In contrast, the windows of the tower
are protected by venetian blinds, the entrance to the tower is outside the prisoner’s view,
and moving into an observational position must not require the opening of doors or
changing of lights -nothing to hint at the presence of a supervisor.44 The tower must
always be visible from the cell, but the actual presence of any observer needs to be
unverifiable for the observed. The audience should have no indication whether or not
they are presently being watched, and constantly aware of the possibility of being seen.
This structural element is responsible for “the major effect of panopticism: to induce in
the inmate a state of conscious and perpetual visibility.”45 The perpetual possibility of
being seen, Foucault argues, creates an “anxious awareness”46 of being observed that
leads the observed to constrain his own action.47
This last element, the anxiousness experienced by the perpetually observed, leads
to the efficiency of the panoptic schema. The Panopticon could simultaneously reduce the
number of supervisors, reduce the frequency of deploying physical force and violent
intervention, while increasing the size of target audience and better controlling the
behaviors of everyone supervised. This is because it enlisted the observed persons into
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the policing practice. The Panopticon incentivizes the observed to self-police. Foucault
insists:
“He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes
responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play
spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in
which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his
own subjection.”
The Panopticon ultimately establishes an internalization of the principles that surround
the target audience. It causes the observed to cooperate with the values and norms of the
institution, and to adopt the enforcement of these principles towards oneself. The anxiety
of knowing one may constantly be judged, leads the condemned to flee into the safety of
conformity, and actively remain there. The Panopticon gains in efficiency by penetrating
into a person’s behavior: it is internalized. A few supervisors can produce the effect of
normalization in a large audience as a result.
The panoptic principles can even be carried to higher orders, by subjecting the
supervisors to similar observation from a director, and then having inspectors or the
public critique the directors. Within the central tower a director could spy on the
supervisors. He could discreetly enter a central position in the tower, so that the
supervisors would never know whether they were in fact under his gaze. He could impose
and enforce a particular regime of “best practice” on his employees, and from his
unverifiable observation he could ensure that it is being implemented.48 Furthermore the
director himself could be supervised. “An inspector arriving unexpectedly at the centre of
the Panopticon will be able to judge at a glance, without anything being concealed from
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him, how the entire establishment is functioning.”49 Such an inspector could deliver
reports on the efficiency of the director and return with reforms, rewards or punishments
as necessary. Indeed, any panoptic institution could be opened to any member of the
society -an openness which ensures that “the disciplinary mechanism will be
democratically controlled.”50 In this way, the Panopticon is able to apply its own
principles to higher levels of supervision. A person in any position in the Panopticon
must be aware of the unverifiable possibility of being subjected to the surveilling gaze.
These orders of supervision help to elaborate a central tension that gives the
Panopticon its particular character as a form of control: it makes the individuals inside the
system vehicles for the application of power, and objects for a body of knowledge. The
central positions and peripheral cells are linked by an uninterrupted supervision. This
supervision is not only utilized to effectively administer judgments (in the form of
punishments or rewards), it also leads to a record, the creation of a body of knowledge:
“an uninterrupted work of writing links the center and periphery.”51 Supervisors take
copious records of the collective events and the individual movements of those beneath
them in the hierarchy. This allows experiments to be rigorously compared, permits
slightly different distributions to be analyzed, and sanctions the “objective” classification
of individuals. Foucault stresses the importance of this double movement:
“what was new, in the eighteenth century, was that, by being combined
and generalized, they attained a level at which the formation of knowledge
and the increase of power regularly reinforce one another in a circular
process. At this point the disciplines crossed the ‘technological’
threshold.”52
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A perpetually refined classification of individuals and an ongoing analysis of the
structures of segmentation are established in the Panopticon to record the fabrication of
self-disciplined, useful individuals. These objects of knowledge and vehicles of
enforcement could be the perfect cogs in a mechanistic, technologized vision of society.
The hope that Bentham describes regarding the implementation of this design
attests of its imagined import:
What would you say, if by the gradual adoption and diversified application
of this single principle, you should see a new scene of things spread itself
over the face of civilized society?—morals reformed, health preserved,
industry invigorated, instruction diffused, public burthens lightened,
economy seated as it were upon a rock, the gordian knot of the poor-laws
not cut but untied—all by a simple idea in architecture?53
Bentham sees a utopian potential contained within this panoptic design. Instead of dark
dungeons and torture chambers we could have bright, well-ordered institutions. If we
spread the panoptic principles throughout the social body, the darkness that permits
immorality could be replaced by a perpetual visibility, a total publicness, in which social
norms would be perpetually enforced--even internally willed!
Perhaps the Panopticon is well understood as a self-enclosed, ideal, utopian
construct, but it still must not be considered a mere fantasy. Foucault offers the
Panopticon as a generalized model for defining power relations. “[The Panopticon] is the
diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form; its functioning abstracted
from any obstacle [...] it is in fact a figure of political technology that may and must be
detached from any specific use.”54 The Panopticon is the ideal type of a disciplinary
institution, and requires “diversified application” in order to spread across society. Its
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optic form must be translated as it is actualized, in order to accommodate resistances and
match the particular behaviors desired.
Bentham insists that the Panopticon can be applied through a process of
translation to any institution. This polyvalence is a key feature: “[i]t can in fact be
integrated to any function (education, medical treatment, production, punishment); it can
increase the effect of this function by being linked closely with it.”55 In any situation
where one is dealing with a mass of bodies expected to perform a particular task or
behave in a certain way, panoptic principles may be implemented to individualize,
instruct, and supervise the crowd.
Among the polyvalent applications imagined for the Panopticon is the instruction
of schoolchildren. Foucault remarks, for example, that a “relation of surveillance, defined
and regulated, is inscribed in the practice of teaching, not as an additional or adjacent
part, but as a mechanism inherent to it and which increases its efficiency.”56 The power
relations of the Panopticon are seamlessly able to merge with the practice of formal
education.
The Panopticon is the ideal model for disciplinary society. This structure
meticulously segments the space, time, and interpersonal relations of the various
supervisors and observed persons within it. The Panopticon is chiefly a machine for
dissociating the typical reciprocity between seeing and being seen. This leads the target
of disciplinary power to simultaneously become a vehicle for discipline, and an object for
a centralized body of knowledge. The target is coerced into internalizing the norms and
values of the institution. Furthermore, the Panopticon can provide the mechanisms for its
55
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own enforcement, by subjecting the observers to the panoptic principle--ultimately
leading to a publically supervised, yet largely self-enclosed institution. Bentham’s
architectural design can be translated to increase the effects and efficiency of various
social practices. I will now investigate how the panoptic form emerged and continues to
operate in direct connection to the school.
Disciplinary Schooling and Docility
Perhaps, at the end of our discussion of the Panopticon, the reader will think that
we are very removed from any actual school. No school that I have ever witnessed is
designed with teachers in a central tower and students locked into a ring of cells. Students
in a public school are not entirely separated from their peers, and teachers are visible
before the students. Administrators have their desks in front offices, not the dark center of
a tower. Yet, Foucault argues that the Panopticon is a pure optic form, necessarily
detached from any particular practice in order to provide an image or a blueprint of
power relations devoid of any particular application.57 It is useful for demonstrating the
constituent aspects of disciplinary power: segmentation/individuation,
publicness/supervision, points of application/objects of knowledge, and
internalization/self-application. These do remain features of the school. In fact, the
Panopticon is partially inspired by disciplinary techniques developed in 18th century
pedagogy.
Foucault argues that, beginning in the18th century, schools applied regulations
and empirical methods to control and correct the behavior of the body in unprecedented
ways. He acknowledges that “in every society, the body was in the grip of very strict
57
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powers,” but the techniques that began to develop in schools in the 18th century had a
distinct form and invasiveness not previously realized.58 The scale of control had never
before been so expansive and exacting as to affect the movements, gestures, and attitudes
of the body. It had never before been organized into a constant coercion that supervises
the activity, in addition to the results, of bodily practices. Unlike previous methods of
control, “[discipline] is exercised according to a codification that partitions as closely as
possible time, space, movement.”59 The organization of time in the school, the design of
spaces for students to occupy, and the instructed movements of the body are hereafter
subjected to constant supervision and refinement. I will explore each of these elements in
turn.
The school segments time in several ways. First, there is a binary division of time
that accompanies the school: the time of instruction and the time of mastery. This
separates the totality of one’s life into two periods. “It is this disciplinary time that was
gradually imposed on pedagogical practice -specializing the time of training and
detaching it from the adult time.”60 By organizing social life into an explicitly educative
period and a period of practice, the school begins to segment the totality of one’s life into
two distinct durations.61 This division creates a standing danger that society may consider
the former period to be the unique time of learning, covering-over the educative
dimensions of the other vital parts of life (work, romance, hobbies, dying, etc.).
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Furthermore, the juxtaposition of the adult period of time and the time of childhood could
lead students to consider their education as an arbitrary obstacle detached from their life
experience.
Disciplinary time also creates a plethora of fixed durations inside the practice of
schooling. Graduation rituals identify the movement of students from one level to
another. For example, I had a graduation ceremony between elementary school and
middle school, between middle and high, upon completing high school, and soon upon
completion of my B.A. Another duration is centered around grading: there are semesters
(or trimesters, or quarters) into which instruction and examination is grouped. There is a
detailed curricula that expects the student to learn (and the teacher to teach) the subject
matter at a regular rate determined by the institution to produce the efficient development
of skills and knowledge. “Draw up series of series; lay down for each individual
according to his level, his seniority, his rank, the exercises that are suited to him. [...] At
the end of each series, others begin.”62 The curricula introduces new material to students
in a prepared unfolding. In my high school, for example, students generally studied
biology during the freshman year, chemistry during the sophomore year, and physics
following upon the completion of chemistry. The school creates periods of time centered
around grading and advancing students through a prepared curriculum.
Time reaches its most specialized organization in the form of timesheets or, in the
parlance of the school, according to the class schedule. These are old devices with a
legacy in the monastic tradition. Timesheets (and other cyclical schedules) serve three
important methods: “[to] establish rhythms, impose particular occupations, regulate the
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cycles of repetition.”63 The school day is separated by the ringing of bells to indicate as
efficiently as possible to the entire student body a change in activities. The bell could
mark the end of a long school day or the beginning of an exciting one. It could usher
students out to the playground or into chemistry class. There no mystery in it, however,
as regular and detailed timetables will have prepared students, teachers, and
administrators for that day’s unfolding. Foucault gives the example of such a timetable in
the Ecoles mutuelles in the early nineteenth century: “8.45 entrance of the monitor, 8.52
the monitor’s summons, 8.56 entrance of the children and prayer, 9.00 the children go to
their benches, 9.04 first slate, 9.08 end of dictation, 9.12 second slate, etc.”64 Such a
timeline regarding the entrance of students to school would not be out of place in the
public schools that I attended, especially when morning assemblies were held (with the
exception of designated prayer).
Space in the school is first organized by the establishment of the campus. The
premises are enclosed; visitors need to obtain special permission to enter, and if an
unknown person entered the campus without permission it would likely cause a
lockdown. The enclosed campus stands in contrast to the rest of the town by enforcing
unique rules and regulations. The campus will typically enforce prohibitions on smoking
and alcohol, for example. Foucault observes that the enclosed model was gradually
imposed in “the colleges, or secondary schools, [...] and boarding appeared as the most
perfect, if not the most frequent, educational regime.”65 With boarding the enclosure of
students in the school could be made perpetual. While boarding is not the prevalent
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model today, the enclosure of the campus is typically enforced even in the absence of
students.
Secondly, school establishes various functional spaces within the campus. These
spaces have their own boundaries, means of supervision, norms, and purposes. The
playground is bounded at the periphery to prevent the free-range of students, and is
designed with smaller functional regions: the blacktop, the basketball hoops, the playstructure, the open field, etc. The classroom erects its own boundaries (walls, windows,
doors), and its own smaller regions (the front of the class is nearly sacrosanct space
reserved for the instructor). Each person is expected to maintain a behavior appropriate to
his or her current functional space. Young students may need to be reminded that they are
not on the playground anymore if they return from recess and are unruly. Foucault
indicates that these functional sites “were defined to correspond not only to the need to
supervise, to break dangerous communications, but also to create a useful space.”66 The
hallway, cafeteria, gymnasium, auditorium, and principal’s office are all different
functional spaces; each serves a specific use: directing persons between places, eating,
exercising, listening, or confessing. These spaces do not merely limit the activity of
students (by preventing aberrant behavior), but entice activity from them (in the
“appropriate” use of the space).
The school even shapes the relationships between students and objects. Foucault
describes “body-object articulations” that code the behavior of the body to pair with
particular instruments. In the school, one is typically “paired” to a desk during
instruction. The student is assigned a desk that they cannot leave without permission. He
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is expected to sit upright, to keep his feet on the floor, to avoid fidgeting, and to keep his
head erect. Through these behaviors, the student’s body is brought into correlation with
the inanimate desk.
Foucault gives the additional example of writing with a pen. “Good handwriting
[...] presupposes a gymnastics--a while routine whose rigorous code invests the body in
its entirety, from the points of the feet to tip of the index finger.”67 Teaching a student
handwriting, involves coordinating the entire body. The writer needs to have the proper
posture. She should plant her feet, square her shoulders, calm her breathing, fix her gaze
to the page, keep her stomach from pressing into the table, surround the base of the pen
with two fingers and the thumb, and repeat the necessary motions of the arm to produce
letters. Disciplining the body is an essential precondition for these efficient gestures.
Quoting a work of pedagogy written by Jean-Baptiste de La Salle published in
1701, Foucault uncovers an early articulation of similar postural demands for
handwriting. La Salle also says that “the teacher will place pupils in the posture that they
should maintain when writing, and will correct it either by sign or otherwise, when the
change position.”68 Teachers need to supervise the activity of the body throughout the
whole duration of the exercise. The operations of the body become the object of this new
power relation, not merely the results. Production and signification are subjected, not just
products and signs. This requires an efficient distribution of desks and the necessary
instruments (writing utensils in this example), so that a teacher can see at a glance that
the exercise is being carried out by all of the students in an orderly fashion.
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Why describe in such detail the spatial, temporal, and instrumental relations in the
school? Foucault argues that these produce “docile bodies.” Situating students in such an
environment allows for the development of their capacities, while guaranteeing the
students organize these skills toward the aims of the institution. “Discipline increases the
forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes these same forces (in
political terms of obedience).”69 Students obey the functions designated for each space,
are habituated to skillful and proper behavior through the repetition and division of time,
and pair with the instruments provided by the institution. These practices increase the
aptitudes of the students in a controlled, observed setting, and the domination of them
likewise increases. They cannot decide the ends of their activity nor meaningfully alter
the environment in which they are situated. These useful, docile students are not yet the
final product of a disciplinary regime, they are merely prepared for the interpersonal
functions that make the Panopticon such an effective instrument of training.
Correct Training of Students
Foucault argues that the spatial, temporal, and instrumental relations in the school
begin the process of disciplining students by increasing their capacities, while preventing
them from acting upon the environment, or even facing it as a structure worth
questioning. These aspects of the school actualize the panoptic form of segmenting space,
time, and objects into a controlled field of activity that produces docility. Yet, we have
only begun to introduce the interpersonal elements that Foucault argues are coresponsible for the investment of behaviors into individual bodies. In the school, the
interpersonal disciplinary techniques are largely executed according to two mutually
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informing mechanisms: hierarchical observation and normalizing judgment. Hierarchical
observation and normalizing judgment reproduce the panoptic form of surveilling and, as
necessary, punishing the observed.70 Beginning with a discussion of observation and
connecting it to judgment, we will begin to see how these processes normalize student
behavior.
In order to efficiently understand and affect the student body, a system of
observation needed to be established to penetrate the entire collective and to survey the
behavior of each individual body. Ideally, this structural model would allow a single
point to witness everything, as the tower at the center of the Panopticon watches the cells,
but Foucault observes that in practice observation and recording needed relays.71 For this
reason a pyramidal system of surveillance was established that ran from numerous
thoroughly-observed students at the base to a few publicly accountable administrators at
the top. In this process, social relations were vertically structured in tiers, with students at
the base, teachers above them, and various administrators above the teachers. Each tier
had ‘cases’ below them to watch and record, except for the students at the very base of
the structure. Extrapolating from Foucault’s observations, we could extend this
hierarchical pyramid to the national level today. Information collected about student
performance at the base of this structure is destined for the highest government offices.
Similarly judgments from these offices can carry back down the hierarchy to alter the
practices surrounding individual students. The hierarchy of observation of the school
70
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begins to be ordered into such a hierarchy in order to achieve a centralized understanding
of the persons and practices within the institution.
Awareness of the perpetual possibility of being observed by other bodies begins
the process of disciplining. Everyone in the school system learns that they are supervised
by those “above” them, and that they could be observed to a certain extent laterally and to
a limited degree from “below.” The greater the possibility of being subjected to
surveilling gazes, the greater is the person’s “anxious awareness of being observed.”72
Students, at the bottom of the established hierarchy have this surveilling gaze most
strongly positioned toward them. Feeling this anxious awareness in their bodies, those in
the visible field do not cease acting altogether, but limit their behavior to what is
considered appropriate by the institution.73 This project of centralized observation created
a pyramid of distributed bodies and concerted gazes, so that the structure in-total made
the school a place of perpetual visibility.74
The process of observation alone does not produce the disciplinary effect of these
social relations, it is coupled with an incisive interpersonal penal mechanism:
normalizing judgment. This judgment is accomplished through a polemic system of
gratification and punishment. Rewards or punishments almost exclusively flow down the
hierarchy and are limited in the other direction. Consider for a possible counterexample a
students’ evaluations of their teacher at the end of a semester. One will observe that these
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evaluations in themselves cannot affect the teacher; they merely serve as data for
administrators to consider when reviewing teachers. Thus, even in student evaluations,
data is being collected from those lower in the structure for persons above them. Students
at the bottom of this hierarchy are constantly susceptible to judgment, teachers are judged
regularly by peers and administrators, administrators are primarily susceptible to
judgment from those higher in the constructed order, superintendents and the highest
state offices are ultimately judged by the public.
The judgments passed down in the institution are themselves objects to be
observed and recorded. By recording the distribution of punishments and rewards,
previously discontinuous acts are transformed into a field of behavior that is quantified
and recorded, thus the school becomes
...subject to a whole micro-penalty of time (lateness, absences,
interruptions of tasks), of activity (inattention, negligence, lack of zeal), of
behavior (impoliteness, disobedience), of speech (idle chatter, insolence),
of the body (‘incorrect attitudes, […] lack of cleanliness), of sexuality
(impurity, indecency).75
The collection of mass data of the student’s behavior transformed the school into an
attentive, punitive environment. Many previously insignificant dimensions of student
behavior could now be examined and targeted for exercises. Exercise is the prefered
means of “punishing” those who are found deviant.76 A reduplicated insistence on the
correct actions was favored over exacting revenge or demanding repentance. The
extensive data of punishments and rewards allowed for the analysis of general trends,
collective events, and widespread practices in the school. Thus, the observation and
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judgment that spread through social institutions serves more than a negative function, it
constructs standards of behavior.
The rigorous observation and judgment passed down in schools and other
disciplinary institutions combine to create what a new “power of the Norm.”77 In short,
the dual practice of observing and judging the students had the effect of normalizing
them. By rigorously tracking and quantifying awards and debits assigned to individuals
for their conduct, one can “objectively” differentiate between the individuals themselves.
The mass data of this judging observation allows individuals to be compared to a
‘whole’--the typical conduct of all. Individuals can then be differentiated according to
their relationship to an average determined by the projects of the disciplinary institution.
“The perpetual penalty that traverses all points and supervises every instant in the
disciplinary institutions compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes, excludes. In
short, it normalizes.”78 Students are systematically compared and differentiated according
to how well they can take up the behaviors expected of them by those above them in the
hierarchy. Abnormal, average, and exemplary acts are established “above” students. The
students internalize these norms (typically without a conceptual understanding of this
arrangement), as they are forced to behave better than a designated minimum threshold,
to respect an average of achievement, and to strive for an optimum.79 As a result
abnormal, average and exemplary individuals are constituted. Students develop their
values within this normalizing environment.
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The normalization effect contributes to Foucault’s demand for a
reconceptualization of the effects of power in general. Foucault thinks that power should
not be conceptualize primarily in negative terms. It should not be said that power
primarily excludes, represses, or censors. Although at times it does all of these, the
primary effect of power is positive: “power produces; it produces reality; it produces
domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be
gained of him belong to this production.”80 By systematically treating each individual
body in the school as an instrument for the exercise of training, and as objects to measure
the success of training, disciplinary power actually fabricates the individual through a
coordination of interpersonal, temporal, spatial, and object relations. This network of
relations holds together, and counter-intuitively creates bodies that are seen as selfstanding, atomistic individuals.
Summary
Following Foucault, I have argued that students necessarily live and develop their
identities within a system power relations, and the school is a privileged site where
disciplinary power shapes the behavior of the enclosed persons. The model of power
relations that dominates in the school and in modern society at large is the Panopticon.
This design organizes functional places, segments time into various periods, provides
exercises with accompanying instruments, and enforces an interpersonal hierarchy in
order to create docile bodies. Furthermore, it acts on these bodies through observation
and judgment (especially during exercises and examinations) in order to normalize them.
Docility and training create the characteristic effects of panopticism: individuation, total
80

Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 194.

41

publicness, internalization, and the intersection of points of application and objects of
knowledge.
Through a reading of Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, I have demonstrated
various ways that the school operates as a disciplinary institution. As any form of power,
it creates a field of “normality” that conditions and limits the socialization of students.
What distinguishes this form of power from previous power relations, is that it
systematically increases the force of the subjected persons, and the forces that subject
them. This is accomplished through a technologizing of power relations: transforming
human behavior into an exact science to be both implemented and studied. The model for
this form of power is the Panopticon--an architectural design that segments time, space,
objects and the distribution of persons in order to enclose bodies under the perpetual
possibility of judging gazes. The school enacts the form of the Panopticon by
implementing spatial, temporal, and instrumental divisions to create “docile bodies.”
These docile students are then interpersonally positioned at the base of a hierarchical
pyramid of observation and judgment in order to train them efficiently into self contained
individuals. In total, these practices normalize students -completing the internalization
and self-policing characteristic of the Panopticon.
While Foucault masterfully discusses the ways in which our behavior is shaped by
technologies of discipline, drawing upon a wealth of historical research, his argument
depends upon some experiential presuppositions for which he cannot account. These
presuppositions will be the my point of departure for the next chapter of the thesis.
Foucault discusses the circulation of power, without discussing the experiences of the
agents that become the vehicle for these relations. His analysis remains at the level of
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social and historical practices, yet it appeals to certain capacities of the body that cannot
be accounted for within the analysis. Foucault argues that power invests itself in an active
body, but this activity is not explored from the perspective of the body. Why does the
arrangement of space and time in the school produce docility? What is it like to develop
habits of behavior? Why does the perpetual possibility of being looked at produce anxiety
and alienation? Exploring this direction of questions seems essential for developing a
complete picture of panoptic schooling.
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CHAPTER 2

STUDENT EXPERIENCE AND THE SCHOOL

“Our view of man will remain superficial so long as we fail to go back to that origin [of silence],
[...] and as long as we do not describe the action which breaks this silence. The spoken word is a
gesture, and its meaning, a world.”81

The concept of discipline effectively explains many of the internal relations of the
school. It accounts for the school’s close segmentation and seriation of time, space, and
movement. Disciplinary schooling cultivates functional places, organizes durations of
time, pairs the body with instruments and supervises the activity of the body as it goes
through exercises and examinations. The school organizes the activity of its students
against a background of hierarchical observation and judgement. Foucault argues that all
of these practices are co-responsible for “disciplining” the bodies of the enclosed persons.
Such disciplined bodies are anxiously aware of the perpetual possibility of being
observed, and exist in total publicness. The disciplined body is tied to its individuality
and separated from others like it. This body is simultaneously an object for a field
knowledge and a vehicle for the application of norms. The disciplined body internalizes
the values of the institution and imposes them on itself. In sum, the disciplined body is
docile and well-trained.
Foucault argues for all of these positions through historical analysis on the level
of social theory, but his argument depends upon numerous presuppositions of embodied
behavior. The pairing of the body with instruments, the sedimentation of habits through
81
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repetition, and the anxious awareness under the panoptic gaze are all bodily mediated
practices that are necessary for discipline to function, but the origins of these practices
are not yet justified within Foucault’s analysis. These unaccounted for forms of behavior
are central to Foucault’s argument that disciplinary schooling promotes the institutionally
sanctioned uses of the body thereby increasing its skills, and reduces the body’s
autonomy and creativity thereby increasing its docility. Since Foucault’s analysis is
focused on social practices and historical developments, he does not include a substantial
analysis of embodiment which could account for these forms of behavior. I will be
arguing that while social practices are surely constitutive of the norms of our time, our
corporeality also delimits normality.
Exploring these presupposed forms of behavior requires an approach that is
attentive to the lived experience of the students. Phenomenology offers this approach.
Phenomenology is both a movement in the history of philosophy and a method of
describing phenomena in a lived, first-person manner. By examining some key
phenomenological concepts, I will extend our understanding of disciplinary schooling
into the lived experience of students. The phenomenologists I will consider in this chapter
are Jean-Paul Sartre, Martin Heidegger, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty; though these
thinkers are not in complete agreement with each other, the concepts used in this
reflection share a common commitment to describing practical human experiences. This
critique enriches the foundations of Foucault’s argument, and allows us to identify the
irreducible value of the concept of discipline.
Before setting out on this new course, however, I should note that Foucault was
highly critical of certain strains of phenomenology. He maintained that the movement
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largely argued on the basis of a constituting consciousness or transcendental subject,
which Foucault thinks is a fallacious starting point.82 In the beginning of Discipline and
Punish he warns:
[from disciplinary technology] various concepts have been constructed
and domains of analysis carved out: psyche, subjectivity, personality,
consciousness, etc.; [from discipline] have been built scientific techniques
and discourses, and the moral claims of humanism.”83
Thus, Foucault thinks that the contemporary understanding of “the soul” (consciousness,
subjectivity, psyche, and similar non-corporeal duplications of the body) is an effect of
disciplinary training and supervision. “The soul is the effect and instrument of a political
anatomy; the soul is the prison of the body.”84 It is the history of this prison that Foucault
wants to write in the first place. Since the concept of subjectivity has a history, the
processes that create subjectivity need to be analyzed and arguments that presuppose a
transcendental subject should be bracketed.85
While there are strains of phenomenology that are guilty of presupposing a
subject and transcendental categories, this criticism does not exhaustively apply to
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phenomenology. The center of the phenomenological tradition is a commitment to
describing the experience of actively belonging to the world. There are phenomenologists
in this vein who argue that “[t]he real is to be described, and neither constructed nor
constituted.”86 Detailed descriptions of the practices through we navigate the world
provide a sufficient basis for philosophical reflection--without needing to appeal to a
constituting consciousness or subject. For example:
Heidegger describes what goes on in our everyday skillful coping with
things and people and how we are socialized into a shared world. [...] [He]
finds that the only ground for the intelligibility of thought and action that
we have or need is in the everyday practices themselves.87
Such descriptive, practice-centered phenomenologies avoid the major criticism Foucault
raises against the tradition, and offer an approach that can explore the active engagement
of the students. This type of phenomenology allows us to more fully grasp the roots of
disciplinary pedagogy.
Foucault’s critical social theory and phenomenology both focus on the behavior
of embodied actors, but they organize their observations with different ends in mind.
Foucault undertakes a genealogical analysis of particular forms of behavior; he tries to
understand their historical roots and political functions. In contrast, phenomenology
examines how particular forms of conduct contribute to a personal relationship with
meaning. More specifically, phenomenological analysis often focuses on understanding
how particular styles of behavior contribute to personal ways of coping with his others
and objects, thereby making oneself “at-home” in the world.88 Since discipline and
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phenomenology have a similar commitment to studying behavior, they can be brought
into a mutually informing analysis.
There are at least three embodied practices presupposed for the functioning of
discipline. Discipline relies on “body-instrument pairings.” Such a relationship to
instruments is more fully explored through Heidegger’s conceptualization of the “readyto-hand,” a term for the way in which instruments are most closely encountered. This
discussion reveals that, phenomenologically speaking, instruments become transparent to
a skilled user deploying them to accomplish a task. Second, discipline presupposes that
repetitive and seriated actions create habits in the bodies of the actor. Merleau-Ponty’s
discussion of the habit-body provides an account of the sedimentation of habits, and the
body’s reliance on formed habits. Discipline also requires the production of an “anxious
awareness” under the perpetual possibility of supervision.89 Sartre describes such an
anxiety producing experience through “the Look” in Being and Nothingness. This
concept helps to account for vulnerability and interdependence that accompanies
embodiment.
Exploring these presupposed behaviors opens another direction that needs to be
explored to understand disciplinary schooling more fully--specifically, an examination of
schooling should develop a concern for the students’ experience of making a home in the
world. This direction of analysis and Foucault’s social theory appear to be mutually
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informing, expanding the concept of discipline and uncovering its irreducible value for an
understanding of modern pedagogy.

Body Instrument Articulations
In chapter 1, I argued that disciplinary schooling pairs the body with instruments
in the process of instructing them. A student’s assigned desk provides an example for
how the student should direct his body. The student is expected to fix himself in place
with his feet on the floor and head erect, mirroring the inanimate desk in which he sits.
Additionally, the pen provides an example of the way that a coordinated movement needs
to be drawn out of the entire body of the student in harmony with the utensil, in order to
produce good handwriting. Foucault argues that the instruments and body of the student
become paired in these forms of behavior, but does not explore the first person
experience of such hitch-free deployment of equipment. Heidegger phenomenologically
interrogates this very experience in Being and Time.
Heidegger observes that when a person uses an object, it is encountered in a way
that is qualitatively different from examining it. If a student examines her pen, for
example, she can experience it as an object with many qualities. The pen may then be
encountered as something colorful, smooth, and capable of a light clicking sound when
the top is pressed. When using the pen, however, it is experienced very differently. In
fact, when one deploys the pen in writing, it does not make sense to say that one
encounters the pen as an independent object at all. Rather than as an independent object,
the pen is encountered as something with which I write, in order to convey my thoughts,
towards a more complete understanding of the subject matter, and for the sake of being a
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writer.90 This is to say that the pen-in-use is encountered through a series of practical
relations.
Heidegger argues that instruments put to use are encountered in a manner that he
calls “ready-to-hand.” Consider the example of hammering:
The less that we just stare at the hammer-thing, and the more we seize
hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it
become, and the more unveiledly is it encountered as that which it is -as
equipment. The hammering itself uncovers the specific ‘manipulability’ of
the hammer.91
While engaged in the skillful manipulation of equipment, it does not “appear” as an
object, rather, it structures our involvement in our current task. The hammering, or
writing is shaped by the instrument deployed, but that instrument does not appear to the
writer or the hammerer while it is in use. While the instrument does not appear as an
object, Heidegger argues that this is a “more primordial” way to encounter the
instrument, because it reveals a rich practice to us. Only by using the instrument does the
nexus of relations that is established by putting the pen into use emerge.
This phenomenological account of equipment confirms that the body can pair
with instruments, but it contains some new implications as well. Discipline delimits what
type of equipment will be available for students to deploy, thereby controlling an
essential factor of how the students will encounter meaning in the world. Yet equipment
only takes on its function to the extent that it is deployed by the students. This would put
a small, but important new emphasis on the pairing of the body with instruments: pairing
with instruments is irreducibly a power of the student’s body. Foucault’s point of
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emphasis is on the social relation. In the school, students are not free to select the
instruments they will encounter, nor to deploy them in creative ways. They are meant to
learn the “normal” way to deploy equipment and they are regularly punished for failing to
do so. Yet, since skillfully pairing with equipment is a feature of our embodiment, a
power structure cannot unilaterally proscribe the use of equipment or the lessons that will
be gleaned by deploying it. We get a more complete picture of the body’s use of
instruments by exploring the body’s development of habits, which Merleau-Ponty calls
“the power [...] of altering our existence through incorporating new instruments.”92

Sedimentation of the Habit-Body
Discipline is a form of power that seeks to control individuals by the “traces” that
it leaves in them, in the form of habits of behavior.93 Foucault argued that repetitive and
seriated exercises of the body of the student will form habits. Once these habits are
formed are they need to be resistant to changes, and directive of future projects if they are
going to continue to discipline individuals. Yet, in order to say that exercises leave traces
in the body, one must acknowledge that the body is capable of sedimenting forms of
behavior into habit. This rhetorical shift provides new investigative opportunities.
Foucault does not explore the significance of forming habits from the student’s
perspective. Discipline relies on habitual traces in the body, but we have yet to explore
what habits are and how they direct us.
Merleau-Ponty provides significant insights into the sedimentation of habits and
their significance in directing a person’s life. In Phenomenology of Perception, he locates
92
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the habitual body as a significant part of one’s experience of the world. For example,
each perceptive act uncovers a habitual body schema “behind” the perception.
My perceptual act [...] benefits from work already completed, from a
general synthesis constituted once and for all. This is what I express by
saying that I perceive with my body or with my senses, my body and my
senses being precisely this habitual knowledge of the world, this implicit
or sedimented science.94
Each particular perceptual experiences testifies to a synthesis that has already take place
in the form of a sedimented system of habit. Habitual knowledge of the world is always
already underway when one has a particular perception of the world. Consider, for
example, waking up in a strange room. At first, I may attempt to see the familiar objects
of my habitual sleeping space. This has me feeling disoriented. The strange room does
not accept my habitual expectations of how my bed is oriented or where the exit is.
However, once I adopt a more passive schema of expectations, objects emerge. At once
the bed and the exit appear in clarity. This brief but common experience testifies to the
existence of habitual expectations.
Habits are patterns of bodily movement that demonstrate the general frameworks
of meaning with which I engage the world. The example of handwriting above
demonstrated that instruments become phenomenologically transparent in our involved
activity; they do not appear as objects in my experience. In such habitually involved
activity, one will notice that my body does not appear as an object either. When writing
with the pen, the ongoing task requires movements of the instrument and movements of
my body, yet as I write, I do not need to constantly consider the positioning of my arms
or movements of my wrists. Similarly, playing a sport requires a dynamic set of motor
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skills that, once developed, can be utilized unreflectively. Such a set of skills even open
opportunities for engaging in the sport in ways that were previously inaccessible.95 By
establishing a habit, I institute “a certain style of motor responses” for engaging with the
world.96 This style of motor responses accounts for the familiarity of where my limbs are
and how instruments should be manipulated as I accomplish habituated tasks.
The temporality of habit presents the complicated relationship between our body
and our world. Habits have a structure of expectation that takes the future as its referent,
and habits are historically developed and reenact a past.97 As indicated in the example of
waking in an unfamiliar room, I expect a particular orientation of objects around me
because of my habits of waking and beginning my day. Such expectations direct me
toward my immediate future, but they also take previous experience as their guide. If I
am strongly habituated to waking in a particular place and then I rearrange my room, I
may experience the same “disappointed” expectation multiple times over the course
several days. This habit may even require deliberate effort to be reformed into a
harmonious system between my body and my new room.
Merleau-Ponty takes an even more dramatic example to illustrate the temporality
of habit in the form of phantom limbs. The phantom limb names a phenomenon where an
amputee experiences sensations from a removed limb, and may even act as though the
limb were still there. Merleau-Ponty argues that while the “actual body” of the patient has
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been altered, the “habitual body” may still need time and practice to adjust.98 During this
period of transition, some of the motor responses that are contained in the habits of the
person are no longer useful for his actual body, yet they can still be solicited from the
amputee. If a man has lost his leg, for example, and there is a knock on the door, the man
may try to raise and answer it, only to fall. “At the same moment that my usual world
gives rise to habitual intentions in me, I can no longer actually unite with it, if I have lost
a limb.”99 His attempt to stand is disappointed because his physical body cannot unite
with his habits. This example of a phantom limb demonstrates that habits not only guide
our expectations of the world, but reenact a world that gave rise to the habit.100
Habits are developed motor responses that create a skillful system between our
bodies and our world. They direct our actions by articulating possibilities for the future,
and reenact our past by creatively deploying the world that gave rise to the habit.
Foucault’s account is supported insofar as habits demonstrate stability over time and
direct us towards our future through their embodied expectations. Yet, Foucault’s account
needs to be qualified insofar as habits are open-ended. Habits do not unilaterally
proscribe how the body will act, or how the world will appear, and habits can always be
adjusted. Indeed the body must constantly adjust habits even in the most mundane
activities, because the current situation in which they are used never perfectly
corresponds to the world in which the habit formed. Additionally, habits are open-ended
because they make further dimensions of meaning available which can lead to the
creation of new habits. Learning to write, for example, can lead to increasing articulate
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levels of thought and action, even into the articulation of unforeseeable ideas or ways of
writing.
Foucault identifies a politics within the formation of habits that seems to be
lacking in Merleau-Ponty’s account. Students do not develop habits in a politically
neutral space. The school imposes exercises and corrective punishment on students to try
to ensure the “proper” development of habits, and puts students through examinations to
simultaneously test the students and the school’s methods. I put the word proper in quotes
here because the disciplinary school is able to determine what the “proper” development
of habit is, and what is improper. After all, discipline “must have its own functioning, its
own rules, its own techniques, its own knowledge; it must fix its own norms, decide its
own results.”101 Many of the students’ habits are acquired through this learning machine:
the disciplinary school. Yet, as I have argued, habituation is a power of the student,
appropriated for discipline, and since it is open-ended it can lead the students in
directions unforeseen by the disciplinary school. Since habits are developed under
panoptic observation, we must examine the experience that such surveillance has on the
body, through Sartre’s “The Look.”
The Look of the School
The effectiveness of disciplinary schooling is predicated on the anxiety students
feel under the perpetual possibility of a surveilling gaze. This anxiety compels the
students to self-police. In Being and Nothingness, Sartre argues that experiencing the
look of another person can result in anxiety and modify a person’s conduct. As a
phenomenologist, Sartre is more concerned with describing the mundane way that actors
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experience a foundational relation to others, than in constructing a more traditional
argument surrounding the problem of other consciousnesses. He finds evidence for our
fundamental relation to others in an experience called “the look.” While “looking” is a
familiar word, as discipline was earlier, Sartre brings a pregnant, technical meaning to the
common word.
Sartre does not explicitly define “looking,” but rather develops a use for the word
in the course of his descriptive account. One point that I will distill about the term, at this
juncture, is that perceiving and looking are interrelated but heterogenous. Sartre says,
“Every look manifest toward me is manifested in connection with the appearance of a
sensible form in our perceptive field.”102 This indicates that a perceptible form is a
necessary condition for a look to be manifested toward me. In order for me to experience
the look, I must perceive a form that is capable of looking at me; I perceive an Other.103
Sartre argues that this form that I perceive looking-at me can manifest in many ways; the
“eyes” of the Other need not be the ocular globes in their head, but could be given in the
perception of a rustling of branches, a light shining into the dark, or an artifice to be
avoided. These forms need not refer to the actual physical eyes of a person, but “in
themselves they are already eyes.”104 The perception of such forms may coincide with the
experience of being “looked-at.”
Sartre continues this line of argument by indicating that the appearance of this
sensible form is not a sufficient condition for “the look.” In order for me to experience
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the look, I also need to perceive this sensible form as “eyes” looking at me, in contrast to
an object to be appreciated by me. The way that a thing appears to me, then, is
distinguished into at least two styles: something can appear to me by my looking at it and
something can appear to me by my being looked-at by it. My experience of looking
presents entities to me as objects and instruments, while my experience of being lookedat recognizes that I can also be seen as an object and an instrument. Sartre argues that
these experiences are mutually excluding, or at least doubts the possibility of
simultaneously perceiving in the mode of looking and in the mode of being looked at.
I should willingly say here: we can not perceive the world and at the same
time apprehend a look fastened upon us; it must be either one or the other.
This is because to perceive is to look at, and to apprehend a look is not to
apprehend a look as an object in the world [...]; it is to be conscious of
being looked at.105
The meaning of the look, then, is that I am seen, that I am a thing that can be seen.106 The
look is the first appreciation of the body’s presence in the world as another object, as
something observable, vulnerable, finite, and manipulable. The look of another teaches
me that there is a irreducible part of my being that I do not constitute or fully know,
precisely because it is not experienced as existing for me. It exists for others. And yet,
since it is not necessary that someone actually rests behind the “eyes” that I experience
looking at me in order for me to experience myself as looked at, Sartre argues that the
look is a “pure reference to myself.” It is a reference that I make to my “being-forothers.”
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The most involved description of an experience of the look that Sartre gives is the
example of a man caught while jealously looking through a keyhole. Imagine that I am
alone in a hallway when I hear friends talking in the next room. I position myself in front
of the door and gaze into the keyhole in order to spy on the events taking place in the
next room. While alone in this example, Sartre stresses, I am functioning on the level of a
non-thetic self-consciousness.107 This means that I am not qualifying and reflectively
considering my acts, I am nothing other than my actions. I am occupied with the process
of utilizing the keyhole (the means) to witness the spectacle occurring across the portal
(his end). I feel jealous, and I organize the hallway and the keyhole in order to witness
the spectacle; at the same time, my jealousy is purely the recognition that there is
something to be seen through the keyhole. This double relation of the seer and the world
around him is a “situation.” In Sartre’s philosophy, situation is the system of inverted
determination (the man’s jealousy organized the world around him, and the world around
him called forth his jealousy) according to which non-thetic experience is shaped. I am
pressed to the keyhole when suddenly I hear footsteps down the hallway!
At hearing the footsteps, I experience myself as a thing seen. The instrumental
complexes that I was freely organizing now emerge as being available to another. The act
of gazing through the keyhole now immediately has the meaning it previously held
(access to the conversation on the other side) and a meaning that appears as being for this
other (a taboo act of spying on others). My actions have an “outside” to be witnessed, and
do not exist as purely my own. With the look, suddenly there is an aspect of my being
which I experience as being inescapably outside of me: it exists for this other. “[B]ehold
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now I am somebody! [...] I am he in the midst of the world in so far as he escapes me.”108
My ongoing non-thetic involvement now has a way of recognizing that it is a being.
Sartre argues that, without the look, the being that I am (the self) can only be posited as
an object by the reflective consciousness; I can mine my past decisions to try to answer
the question “what am I?”, or I can look to the future to answer this question by
promising to be something.109 With experience of being looked at, the non-thetic
consciousness gains a way of experiencing its being, through the possibility of being
appropriated by the other’s projects. The being that is engaged in the interruptive moment
of being looked at proposes only a limited answer to the question “what am I?,” because
it answers with a being that is only partially mine; I am it, but it is not for me.
Now that I have been seen, I perceive the hallway and my possibilities differently.
I begin enacting some of the possibilities that surround me, but now these possibilities
emerge “in the presence of the other,” as though I remember the rupture that the look
brought to my situation.
These few remarks will become more concrete if we recall an experience
familiar to everybody: if we happen to appear “in public” to act in a play
or to give a lecture, we never lose sight of the fact that we are looked at,
and we execute the ensemble of acts which we have come to perform in
the presence of the look; better yet we attempt to constitute a being and an
ensemble of objects for this look.110
When I am caught peeping through the keyhole, I still experience the possibility of
looking through it, of running away, or of hiding in a dark corner, yet now all these
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possibilities immediately contain an aspect that is mediated by the person looking at me.
So, while there are still numerous actions available to me, I recognize that these potential
acts will be seen and interpreted by this other, and insofar the other transcends my
actions. Deciding my personal projects now occurs in the presence of the other’s look.
Whatever I do, I now do as a thing seen and not merely as a seer.
“The look” vividly describes the experience of being looked at. Much like the
panoptic gaze, it can affect the body with anxiety and tension. Neither Foucault’s
panoptic observation, nor Sartre’s look requires the actual presence of an observer; both
are ultimately relations that I make to myself. Furthermore, in the presence of the look,
the spatial experience of perceived is altered to take into account the values of the
supposed watcher. By framing the look as an embodied experience, Sartre’s description
fills a gap in Foucault’s work. It provides a more complete defense for the conformity
and self-policing that Foucault argues is central to the efficiency of discipline but never
elaborates upon.
Sartre examines the look for its existential functions, whereas Foucault examines
the gaze for its historical and political significance. If we follow the existential emphasis,
the gaze folds into the issue of making a home in the world. To make this turn, we would
need to follow Sartre in examining how the gaze informs a person’s mode of being with
others. For the purposes of my argument, I would suggest that the look illustrates the
fundamental dependency that each of us has to each other, namely that “being-seen
constitutes me as a defenseless being for a freedom which is not my freedom.”111 In
being-seen, I am able to recognize the vulnerability that necessarily accompanies
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embodiment in a world with others. How one faces this vulnerability would reveal its
existential meaning.
One critical difference for the panoptic gaze is that it tries to maintain the school
as a “public” place, so that the student is constantly aware of the possibility of being
looked at. These constant interruptions could amplify the feeling of vulnerability Sartre
describes. Additionally, since the Panopticon tries to keep the student in the position of
the person looked-at, the student cannot reverse the experience of the gaze and evaluate
the structure that individualizes him. “He is seen, but does not see; he is the object of
information, never a subject in communication.”112 This keeps the student from
experiencing the responsibility that accompanies the gaze. In Sartre’s formulation, we are
vulnerable to the freedom of the others around us, and they are vulnerable to our
freedom. The Panopticon dissociates this reciprocity. We are vulnerable to its gaze, but it
is not vulnerable to ours.

Summary
I argued that Foucault’s concept of discipline was insufficient as long as it did not
account for the behaviors of the student necessary for it functioning. This critique of
discipline from the tradition of phenomenology helps to establish forms of student
engagement in the school that could not be the result of an investment of power. These
forms of behavior largely supplemented Foucault’s argument, rather than refuting it. Yet,
they do provide some important qualifications for discipline. This critique helps to
demonstrate the role of individual agency in what could otherwise appear to be the mere
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interplay of forces--of power and resistance dialectically dueling over the history of the
society. Phenomenological analysis instructs us that the student’s body is not a lifeless
object, inscripted with the significances of its culture, nor is it a soul pre-existing the
cultural institutions that provide a stock of meanings for the body to deploy.
Yet, the phenomenological tradition is insufficient for political analysis as long as
it cannot address the situations of power within which persons develop and maintain their
bodies. Judith Butler, recognizing the importance of both of these levels of analysis,
argues that
[T]he relation between acts and conditions is neither unilateral nor
unmediated. There are social contexts and conventions within which
certain acts not only become possible, but become conceivable as acts at
all. The transformation of social relations becomes a matter, then, of
transforming hegemonic social conditions rather than the individual acts
that are spawned by those conditions. Indeed one runs the risk of
addressing the merely indirect, if not epiphenomenal, reflection of those
conditions if one remains restricted to a politics of acts.113
The description of embodied activity uncovered by reading Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty,
Sartre, and Steinbock demonstrates the significance of acts by the students necessary for
the concept discipline to be coherent. Yet, recognizing the activity of the body
presupposed for schooling to take place does not proscribe a liberatory pedagogy. One
would need to turn again to social critique, to an analysis of the conditions within (and
often against) which students develop a home, in order to determine the liberatory
possibilities latent in the current practice. Perhaps this is the irreducible contribution of
Foucault’s analysis, the understanding of normality in any society is predicated on the
actions of those within it, but it is not reducible to those actions.
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So, while in Chapter 1, I argued that discipline continues to function as a unifying
power structure in schools and that it constructs the norms within which students learn, in
chapter 2, I have argued that the corporeality of students also participates in the
establishment, support, and transformation of norms. Indeed, Foucault’s analysis of
discipline seemed incomplete by failing to investigate the features of embodiment
necessary for the disciplining of behavior to occur. Now we have two directions to
approach schooling: it is a process by which society invests habits of behavior into bodies
and it is a process by which bodies deploy modes of behavior to interact with a
meaningful world. An interesting consequence of the analysis at this point is that these
directions are not mutually exclusive. Rather, each seems to be true, and a nuanced
understanding of schooling would recognize that analyzing the school from both of these
directions creates a mutually informing understanding of the institution. Yet, these
aspects of the school can chafe against each other.
Disciplinary schooling amounts to an appropriation of fundamental ways that
students engage with meaning, in order to promote docility. Students develop meaningful
body practices as they navigate the school, yet they perform these practices under a
situation of duress that severely limits their ability to creatively engage with their
world.114 Foucault’s assessment of discipline is irreducibly valuable for its elaboration of
the political context in which students develop relations to instruments, develop habit for
navigating the world, and develop relations to their visibility before others. Our
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existential development in the school is best understood as a responsive strategy
necessary to safeguard meaning.
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CHAPTER 3

DANGERS OF DISCIPLINARY SCHOOLING

“A boundary is not that at which something stops but, as the Greeks recognized, the boundary is
that from which something begins its presencing.”115

Having examined the disciplinary functions of the school and the
phenomenological underpinnings of that disciplinary power, it is now is worthwhile to
the definition of education proposed by John Dewey. In chapter 1, I argued that many
internal relations in the school can be understood through the organizational concept of
discipline. This was revealed to be a technology of power that aims at creating docile and
useful individuals. Discipline invests habits into the bodies of individuals, accounting for
the re-creation of social practices and values. Strictly speaking, this fulfills the social
definition of education as the communicating of habits of thinking, doing, and feeling in
order to sustain the life of the group. In chapter 2, I argued that students need to enact
several presupposed forms of conduct if discipline is to function. These forms of conduct
revealed ways that students experience meaning in their lives, and open new areas of
meaning to engage. As we saw in the introduction, this accords with Dewey’s definition
of education at the individual level as growth: the broadening and deepening of
experience.
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This definition emerges again in our discussion here so that I can make a limited,
but important point: education happens in the school. Even when the school is understood
as a disciplinary technology that can fix its own standards and decide its own results,
there is evidence of an educative dimension that befits Dewey’s definition. Yet, Dewey’s
model for education looks radically different from the form of education uncovered by
Foucault. This difference is a result of the different aims of their investigations. Foucault
does not provide a normative concept of education or schooling, but this is precisely what
Dewey invents. His normative system is incorporated into his understanding of growth: it
is its own end. Education, then, should not be understood as a movement toward a fixed
goal. When this happens “the adult environment is accepted as a standard for the child.
He is brought up to it.”116 Rather than educating students into a particular environment,
Dewey argues that we must educate students to be the shapers of their environment. This
allows Dewey to argue that while education surely still happens in the disciplinary
school, “the value of school education is the extent in which it creates a desire for
continued growth and supplies means for making the desire effective in fact.”117 In the
first regard, disciplinary schooling does not concern itself with cultivating the desire for
continued growth in students. In the second, it precludes opportunities to make such
desire effective, unless the desired growth conforms to the aims determined by the
institution. Dewey’s model for education requires that students become co-partners in the
shared activities of the group. This requires opportunity to transform social institutions,
not merely to be transformed by them.
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Since education is this ongoing social process, Dewey argues for a particular ideal
for society in order to establish criteria for educating. Dewey argues that a democratic
ideal for society best corresponds to the principle of growth as its own end. Democracy is
“more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living.”118 This
mode of living is identifiable through two factors in the society. In the first, a democratic
society promotes numerous and varied points of common interest between its members,
allowing them to form greater recognition of their interdependence. In the second, the
democratic mode of living promotes the freer interaction between social groups within
society. In these organic interconnections between persons and groups, society changes.
Dewey argues that “[a] society which makes provision for participation in its good of all
its members on equal terms, and which secures flexible readjustment of its institutions
through interaction of the different forms of associated life is in so far democratic.” This
second criterion is the more significant in light of our discussion of disciplinary
schooling. Discipline does not secure flexible readjustment of its institutions, but rather
uses institutions to try to efface differences in the society. Discipline is then antithetical
to a democratic society.
Personal and social growth is the end of education that Dewey advocates, but
disciplinary pedagogy organizes extensive scientific means to regulate growth and make
it useful for the panoptic machinery. Through its segmentation of time, space, and
movement, discipline attempts to solicit the skillful growth of abilities in students without
allowing them to organize their faculty of growing toward their own ends. The
Panopticon supplies the means for its own measurement and reform, making it highly

118

Ibid., 87.

67

resistant to transformation by any particular member of the society. Students are
especially discouraged from transforming the disciplinary system: it resists their gaze, it
appropriates their habituations, and it delimits their instruments, time, and space. In the
exhaustive system that discipline establishes, society is encouraged to tacitly reproduce
the contemporary power structures. In disciplinary pedagogy, it seems as though our
bodily power to grow in open-ended ways is limited and even appropriated within the
ends of the institution. By way of concluding, then, I would like to further explore the
danger that is implicit in disciplinary pedagogy by exploring the ends that this technology
pursues.

The Danger of Disciplinary Technology
Foucault argues that discipline is a technology for organizing power relations. By
phenomenologically questioning technology, we may be able to elucidate the danger of
disciplinary schooling. Heidegger can guide us into this kind of reflection on technology
through his essay “The Question Concerning Technology.” It is even possible that
Foucault’s use of technology has Heidegger’s discussion in mind. In an interview,
Foucault once said,
Heidegger has always been for me the essential philosopher… I still have
the notes I took while reading Heidegger - I have tons of them! - and they
are far more important than the ones I took on Hegel or Marx. My whole
philosophical development was determined by my reading of
Heidegger.119
If Heidegger did have this profound of an influence on Foucault’s philosophy, then the
use of the word technology to describe disciple should not be taken lightly. Examining
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the disciplinary school in light of the dangers that Heidegger argues are inherent to the
way mankind currently uses technology may help us into the normative criticism of
discipline begun by returning to Dewey.
In modern society we are inundated technology, and yet it can be difficult to step
back and consider the term “technology” itself. If we begin with the example of a
technology, like my computer, we may observe that is a tool on which I can type in order
to write an essay (among other possible uses). Generalizing from the experience of
particular technologies, like computers, we could say that “technology” is artificial
equipment that assists in its user’s pursuits. It is a means of applying particular tools and
practices to the ends determined by the user. The school, according to this understanding
of technology, is a particular set of tools (teachers, classrooms, books) and practices
(lectures, examinations, discussions, rituals) organized toward the society’s goal of
educating the students. Two elements of our current definition are that technology is
anthropocentric (human-made and organized for human aims) and instrumental (a means
for accomplishing projects).
Heidegger’s “Question Concern Technology” brackets the assumed
anthropocentric and instrumental definition of technology, in order to question what
modern technology does in its own right. Our natural attitude assumes technology is
merely a means to human ends, but such things as means and ends properly belong to
causality. Understanding technology, then, is tied to our understanding of the relations of
cause and effect. Reflecting on Aristotle’s doctrine of the four causes, Heidegger notices
that whenever we are concerned with instrumentality--the means of something, our
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concern is situated within the broader and more primordial interest in causality. The
instrumental aspect of technology corresponds to Aristotle’s efficient cause.120
All of Aristotle’s causes are possible accounts for what created an effect. If we
wanted to respond to the question “why is that statue in the temple?” using the four
causes Aristotle identifies, we would reply that the marble (material cause) was shaped
into Athena’s likeness (formal cause) through the art of sculpting and the sculptor’s effort
(efficient cause) in order for the people to worship (final cause). The means leading to the
effect--the efficient cause--is but one of the causes united and co-responsible for any
effect. Uniting all causes, according to Heidegger, is the presencing of the nonpresent.
Aristotle’s four causes taken together provide the broadest description for the way entities
appear. Causality, then, denotes the revealing of entities, in Heidegger’s terms it bringsforth beings. Reflecting on the greek word for technology, “techne,” Heidegger finds
evidence for his regrounding of technology within revealing because this ancient Greek
word meant: “it reveals whatever does not bring itself forth and does not lie here before
us.”121 The meaning of “techne” was more expansive than the meaning carried in the
modern word “technology.” It named the activity of the craftsman, but also “the arts of
the mind, and the fine arts.”122 Heidegger goes on examine this reduction of meaning.
Modern technology is a particular style of revealing. It is no longer characterized
as techne, which denoted the broadest sense of bringing beings forth. Instead, technology
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reveals being in a manner Heidegger calls “challenging-forth.” Whereas humans have
always used technology to set things in order, the ability of technology to set the world in
order was once much more limited. The technology of the craftsman enabled the
discovery of a valuable resource lying dormant in a block of wood, but the technology of
the modern era can calculate the value of the resources dormant in whole forests. Nature
is now challenged to show its utility and to reveal itself as equipment.123 Technology
challenges all entities in the world to appear as something “standing reserved” to be used.
Heidegger is arguing that technology is better understood as a movement, an
impulse that brings the earth into an efficient, self-perpetuating system. The guiding
principle of this system is efficiency; it aims “toward driving on to the maximum yield at
the minimum expense.”124 As the “standing-reserve,” entities are revealed according to
their availability and utility, and are increasingly ordered according to this logic of
efficiency. Heidegger argues that this ordering of the world is the end of technology. It
serves no greater purpose than bringing more entities into the system.
Heidegger takes the directive power of the logic of efficiency a step further, by
arguing that the pressure for maximal efficiency also orders the intersections between
entities that are “standing-reserve.” He illustrates this through the example of the Rhine
in Germany. A hydroelectric dam can be laid across the river in order to make its motion
dispense electrical energy. Now the river is revealed as a power supplier, and appears to
be something under our command. Surely the river can also be witnessed as standing
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against us as it has revealed itself to earlier generations, as an object present before us?
Provocatively, Heidegger claims that this is possible “in no other way than as an object
on call for inspection by a tour group ordered there by the vacation industry.”125 The style
with which the Rhine is standing reserve may be different when it is dammed or made
into a vista, but the logic is upheld. The river is challenged to reveal its utility (whether as
a scenic view or as a power supplier) and the people are guided to be the instrument that
orders the actual into the standing reserve. The example of the dam illustrates that
“challenging-forth” runs along its own interlocking paths, so that various modes of
“standing reserve” may intersect, but such intersections are still ultimately guided by the
logic of efficiency.126 It may be useful to have a river as a beautiful vista, and it may be
useful to have the river as a power supplier, but whether the river is commanded to stand
reserved in one form or the other still depends on the logic of maximizing efficiency.
Seeing how technology creates the standing reserve, Heidegger argues that
technological activity is not set to human ends, but to its own. The role of humanity in
“challenging-forth” is to mistakenly think that technology fits our purposes and is under
our control, while we embrace the technological drive to order the actual evermore into
the standing reserve. The lack of recognition of technologies autonomous movement
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subsumes our efforts under its chains.127 Humanity is the one called into this form of
revealing, and this can be the supreme danger of technology:
As soon as what is unconcealed no longer concerns man even as object,
but exclusively as standing-reserve, and man in the midst of
objectlessness is nothing but the orderer of the standing-reserve, then he
comes to the brink of a precipitous fall; that is, he comes to the point
where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve. Meanwhile,
man precisely as the one so threatened, exalts himself and postures as
lord of the earth.128
The supreme danger of this form of revealing is that it may dogmatically expel other
forms of knowledge and bring all beings, even mankind, appear purely as the standingreserve: maximally available for use, efficient, and set to no other end than more deeply
ordering the world.
Foucault provides an analysis of the form of technology that is most directly
concerned with ordering humanity into standing-reserves: discipline. The chief effect of
disciplinary power is the production of truth. As Foucault indicated: “it produces reality;
it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that
may be gained of him belong to this production.”129 Producing truth in Heidegger’s
language is “revealing that which does not show itself”--it is techne. Discipline is a
technology set to ordering students into “the standing-reserve” by trying to create
maximally skilled, maximally docile bodies. Foucault’s examination of discipline
uncovers the power structures that are preeminently concerned with producing the
“standing-reserve” out of mankind.
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Even if technology has an autonomous direction, it is a movement in which we
actively participate. How we relate to the movement of technology is an interesting issue
for Heidegger. He thinks that technology should not be merely embraced nor blindly
rebelled against; rather, by recognizing the essence of technology, one can place
technology within the proper bounds--using its form of ordering of the world as a source
of meaning, but not as the only source of meaning. Entities appear to us as “standing
reserves” through the approach of modern technology, but no single approach ever
exhausts the meaningfulness of the entities. Steinbock calls this type of observation a
“fundamental phenomenological insight, namely, that the way something gives itself
corresponds simultaneously to the manner in which we turn toward it.”130 While
Heidegger argues that technology accounts for the predominant way in which modern
man relates to entities, it need not be the only way. Opening other ways for entities to
appear requires a diversity of ways of turning toward them; perhaps it even requires
unforeseen ways of engaging the world. Yet as Foucault has demonstrated, disciplinary
technology does not encourage such creative relations to the world.
The supreme danger of the disciplinary school is that it can autonomously dictate
the standards for education and suppress the capacities of students to direct their own
growth. As a technology, the disciplinary school participates in technology’s essence
insofar as it creates its own autonomous direction for education. It is a technology that
claims to serve the existential need for education, but it is able to determine what our
education needs are and how they are best accomplished. These established mechanisms
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are difficult to face as a structure, and harder still to change by appealing to values
outside of the institution.
This investigation reveals that, strictly speaking, there is no politically neutral
education. Indeed, education may be one of the most critical and sensitive grounds for
politics. This is why we need to advocate for politically liberatory forms of education.131
When a political problem is identified, very often there is a call for educative changes; it
is thought that if people had more of the facts or were better trained, then a great many of
the world’s problems could be overcome. What this investigation reveals is not that we
need to adjust what we educate, but rather that we need to be careful how we educate.
These practices are always positioned somewhere between the limit cases of merely
ordering the world into the “standing-reserve” and critically interpreting and transforming
the structures of our world.
In the last lines of Discipline and Punish, Foucault gives a hopeful imperative.
After describing the body as entirely situated within strategies of incarceration, Foucault
says,
[i]n this central and centralized humanity, the effect and instrument of
complex power relations, bodies and forces subjected by multiple
mechanisms of ‘incarceration,’ objects for discourses that are in
themselves elements for this strategy, we must hear the distant roar of
battle.132
I take this imperative to be somewhat of a call to arms. Rally the troops, for a battle is
underway--a battle that could inaugurate new forms of meaning, or simply perpetuate the
ordering of the world into “the standing reserve.” If the non-corporeal duplications of the
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body (the soul, the subject, consciousness) are a product and means of discipline, then it
seems that Foucault has left us with limited means around which a strategy of resistance
can be formed. In response to this problem, I have argued that radically attending to the
body as the bearer of behavior provides a useful launching point for social critique. Our
very corporeality, when understood not as an object but as the means of having a world,
can be used to advocate against discipline. Yet, we should remember that critique itself is
a tremendous risk: it involves attacking the very structures that have helped to install us
into a meaningful world. If these structures have set us into a meaningful world, does this
mean that they are inviolable? Such thinking, I can now add, is the supreme danger of our
technological age. Instead of thinking these structures are inviolable, the significance of
our world is actually extended and preserved, counter-intuitively, through the freedom to
creatively and critically reimagine its foundations.
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